Flu Vaccines: Technology Developments and Effects

Flu Vaccines: Technology Developments and Effects Flu, also known as Influenza, is a contagious viral disease that affects the respiratory system. It is caused by influenza viruses. It is highly infectious unpredictable disease that spreads though secretions of nose and lungs. Flu causes mild to severe illness and sometimes even leads to death. According to U.S. CDC, in an average year, 5 to 20 percent of the U.S. population gets the flu, more than 200,000 people are hospitalized with seasonal flu-related complications and about 36,000 people die from flu-related causes.  [1]   Flu vaccination is one of the best ways to protect the community from the seasonal and pandemic flu effects. Pandemic flu is different from seasonal flu,  [2]  it is a global disease outbreak that usually occurs when a flu strain new to humans emerges and causes widespread illness. The pandemic flu is very dangerous because of newly originated strain to which humans have little pre-existing immunity and vaccines would probably not be available immediately in early stages of pandemics.2 The pandemic outbreaks have potential impact on society causing high levels of illness, death, economic loss and social disruption. Recently in 2009 a novel H1N1 virus emerged which became pandemic. It is estimated that in U.S., approximately 43-89 million persons became ill because of this pandemic H1N1. It also resulted in deaths among children, adults, pregnant and post-partum women. On the other hand seasonal flu form occurs seasonally, usually in winter. Seasonal flu causes significant illness and in some cases death. Annual vaccination: Flu vaccination is most effective way to control and prevent influenza virus infections and severe complications. It is especially important for younger children and people who are at high risk of catching infections. Flu vaccines are available as Flu shot of trivalent inactivated or killed virus (TIV) or Live Attenuated Influenza Vaccine (LAIV) as nasal spray. However, it is impossible to prevent influenza by one time vaccination because Influenza viruses undergo changes from year to year and develop resistance making previously available vaccines ineffective. Therefore scientists make different flu vaccine every year. In addition the immunity developed from having the flu caused by one strain does not always offer protection against new strain. Immunity also declines over time after previous years vaccination and at a point it may be too low to provide protection after year. Hence to combat with changing influenza viruses, vaccination is done every year. Getting seasonal flu vaccin ation offers protection that lasts throughout the year preventing infection and its complications. Vaccine recommendations: The World Health Organization organizes meetings twice a year and recommends inclusion of specific virus strains in Influenza vaccine based on results of surveillance, laboratory and clinical studies, and the availability of vaccine virus strains. Then individual countries make their own decision about inclusion of virus strains in vaccines licensed in their country. In U.S., each year, a panel of experts from agencies such as the FDA and the CDCs Advisory committee on Immunizations Practices (ACIP) studies the available data and decides which three strains of influenza viruses will most likely be active during the next flu season. The selection of vaccine strains for inclusion in seasonal flu vaccine is based on circulating virus strains, how they are spreading, and how well current vaccine strain protects against newly identified strains.  [3]  The ACIP makes written recommendations for administration of vaccines to children and adults. These recommendations include age for administration, doses, dosing interval, precautions and contraindications.  [4]  The seasonal flu vaccine for 2010-2011 offers protection against H3N2 virus, an influenza B virus and pandemic H1N1 virus that emerged in 2009. Vaccine Shortage Issue: There are many issues related to flu vaccines. Among many vaccine shortage is the most noticed every year. A close examination reveals that the shortage for vaccine is not one cause but several. Some of them include high risk of contamination in vaccine production, unpredictable consumer demand, and low profits along with lack of liability protection from costly lawsuits made many manufacturers out of flu vaccine business.  [5]   Most of the companies stopped production of flu vaccine because the demand varies from year to year, as it is always unpredictable and once flu season passes away the remaining stock is useless because a new vaccine is required to deal with changing strains of virus  [6]. According to 2003 report by Institute of Medicine, a unit of National Academy of Sciences, the companies producing vaccines dropped from 30 to 5 in year 2004.6 The companies producing injectable influenza vaccine dropped to two (Chiron Aventis Pasteur) in year 2005.5 Production of flu virus vaccine is very complicated and expensive, but the government keeps price of flu vaccine low. Among the two firms Chiron was forced to shut down its UK plant because of quality control reasons. This resulted in shortage. Another problem is that each year, the U.S. Food and Drug Administrations Vaccines and Related Biological Products Advisory Committee meets in spring identifies the flu virus strains to be protected by flu vac cine manufactured for that fall-winter flu season.5 This time gap between committees decision and following flu season allows manufactures to make vaccines but the flu strains can undergo changes by the time vaccines are manufactured for flu season. Thus it is difficult to determine for what strains of flu virus vaccine should be made which may end up with vaccine shortage for specific flu season. In 2003 committee voted to include the Panama flu virus in vaccine for the 2003-04 flu seasons, excluding Fujian flu mutant virus, a more virulent but less prevalent at that time. But the winters flu outbreak consisted almost entirely of the Fujian strain. CDC without noticing it recommended widespread vaccination which did not protect the public against the prevalent flu strain. The CDC later admitted the vaccine had no or low effectiveness against ILI (influenza-like illness). Latest development in flu vaccine research: The outbreak of pandemic flu has motivated increase in flu research The recent advancement in field of flu vaccine research is development of Universal flu vaccines. Scientist Dr. Sarah Gilbert and team at Oxford Jenner Institute developed universal flu vaccine that target proteins inside flu that are common across all strains and tested on humans infected with flu  [7]. Gilbert used 11 healthy volunteers for her study and vaccinated and then infected them along with 11 non-vaccinated volunteers. Upon careful monitoring there has been dramatic increase in T-cell count in vaccinated subjects which play important role in producing immune response, protecting against viral infections. Researchers of University of Adelaide, Dr. Darren Miller and his colleagues, have trialled a universal synthetic flu vaccine in mice which is another step closer to development of a universal flu vaccine. It is derived synthetically which does not require annual reformulation which would be advantageous to control and prevent flu. Dr. Miller used specific peptides derived from noses of mice to trigger an immune response to a tiny region of flu virus that is present in all influenza A and B viruses, which effectively neutralizes the virus.  [8]   The studies have shown that test vaccine provided mice with 100% protection against a laboratory strain of H3N2 and 20% protection against a highly pathogenic bird flu virus.8 This positive response provides scope for further laboratory and clinical testing. Economics of Flu vaccination: Economic studies indicate that flu vaccination reduces healthcare, societal, and individual costs and also productive losses associated with influenza illness.  [9]  A study of a larger population comparing persons aged 5064 years with those aged à ¢Ã¢â‚¬ °Ã‚ ¥65 years estimated the cost-effectiveness of influenza vaccination to be $28,000 per QALY saved (in 2000 dollars) in persons aged 5064 years compared with $980 per QALY saved among persons aged à ¢Ã¢â‚¬ °Ã‚ ¥65 years (393).Two studies in the United States indicated that vaccination can reduce both direct medical costs and indirect costs from work absenteeism and reduced productivity (79,394). Latest flu pandemics and their effect on the Regulatory world: The pandemic flu is unpredictable, spreads rapidly world wide affecting large proportions of the human population. There have been three influenza pandemics of which the recent one was the 2009 flu pandemic. This occurred first in Mexico, March 2009 caused by pandemic H1N1/09 virus also referred to as swine flu. It is subtype of Influenza A virus. On 10th of August 2010, the Director General of WHO announced that H1N1 pandemic virus has moved into post-pandemic period.  [10]  CDC estimated that nearly a 1 million cases of 2009 H1N1 pandemic flu had occurred in United States. The pandemic H1N1 flu cases doubled in many countries from mid-June 2009 to early July 2009. According to WHO statistics, 18,000 deaths were reported because of H1N1. This outbreak resulted in extraordinary illness throughout the world with increased demand for vaccination against the swine flu virus in a short time. The pandemics put intense burden on the regulatory authorities as vaccines have to be made available globally to meet the increased demands. Regulatory agencies adopted procedures for accelerated approval of vaccines against swine flu. In U.S., FDA expanded its capacity to expedite development, evaluation and licensing of additional flu vaccines and manufacturing facilities to meet pandemic preparedness needs  [11]. CBER has issued guidelines encouraging vaccine manufacturers to explore cell-culture and recombinant techniques, and to incorporate biological integrators, such as immune response, into their product-development designs.  [12]  The outbreak of pandemic flu also has increased collaboration among foreign regulatory agencies to share vaccine safety information and experiences and mount a coordinated response to the emer gency. Beta Lactam Antibiotics: Examples and Uses Beta Lactam Antibiotics: Examples and Uses The beta-lactam antibiotics for their extensive scale of actions are preferred most among antimicrobial factors. The penicillins and cephalosporins are the two categories of this ÃŽ ² lactam antibodies that are extraordinarily less toxic to organisms.(1) At present ,the ÃŽ ²-lactam groups of antibiotics are the highest frequently used universal antibiotics .(2) Cellular membrane of most bacteria enclosed by a cell wall but an extra outermost layer seen on some of them. The periplasmic space in gram negative bacteria is the cavity in the middle of the cell membrane and the cell wall. Periplasm instead of a clearly defined periplasmic space is retained by most gram positive bacteria .(3) But peptidoglycan is the greatest significant element of the cell wall that linked as a new cell by way of the metabolic absorption in periplasm is a polymer made of N-acetyl muramic acid alternating with N-acetyl glucosamine.Arises of the bacterial cell that is actually a process of peptidoglycan synthesis where accumulation of 5 amino acids to N-acetyl muramic acid is one of the leading phases. A precursor of peptidoglycan that conducted by a cell wall acceptor crossway the cell membrane in the periplasm and developed by linking N-acetyl glucosamine to the N-acetyl muramic acid . Generous crosslinking occurs for two key enzymes (trans peptidase and D-alanyl carboxypeptidase) and for the capacity to bind penicillins and cephalosporins, they are recognized as the penicillin binding proteins. B4 Development of cell wall by cross linking of a number of films of peptidoglycan grounds numerous layers and a much denser cell wall in gram positive bacteria than gram negative bacteria. Beta-lactam ring attach enzymes to cross-link peptidoglycans, that is a chemical structure which is available in the beta-lactam antibiotics consist of all penicillins and cephalosporins. Synthesis of bacterial cell wall is prevented by the affect of beta-lactam when transpeptidase and D-alanyl carboxypeptidase enzymes are attaching there by means of cross-linking and cause deterioration of bacterial cell wall.b5 As a bactericidal agents the antibiotic-penicillin binding protein complex of beta-lactam antibiotics excites autolysin discharge that have the capability of digest cell wall that left after bursting a cell. Generally, excessive inner osmotic pressure possessed by gram positive bacteria and in a low osmotic pressure enclosed atmosphere , cells those are lack of a usual and rigid cell wall are burst out.b6 There are many different types of methods of that bacteria became reistance to beta-lactam antibiotics. Transformation is one of the most important mechanisms among them and in the mean time of this process transfer of chromosomal genes between bacterium happens. Due to the death of a a resistance gene in a bacterium releasing of naked DNA in surrounding environment happens. a process known as homologous transformation and by this method the resistance gene in the host bacteria transferred from the naked DNA to the chromosome. the segment of the host DNA have been remodelled by resistance genes results altered penicillin binding proteins production by coding for cross-linking enzymes. But still cross linking of the peptidoglycan layers of the cell wall happens due to these altered penicillin binding proteins and reduces affinity for beta-lactam antibiotics and the bacterium became resistance. In penicillin-resistant S. pneumonia, this process caused the acquirement of genes from othe r naturally arising penicillin-resistant Streptococcus species. Bacteria grow into resistant to beta-lactam antibiotics by one more significant system is by the construction of enzymes capable of deactivating or altering the drug formerly it has a chance to apply its outcome on the bacteria.   peni The first human gammaretrovirus that is Xenotropic murine leukemia virus-related virus (XMRV) and responsible for chronic fatigue syndrome and prostate cancer (PC) have been revealed in recent times. Gammaretroviruses family is famous for their capability to activate cancer in the infested hosts. Analyzing study showed that vaccine-induced XMRV Env -specific binding and neutralizing antibodies (NAb) titers had limited span but highly changeable. in antibody levels, the different incidence stated for XMRV in a number of prostate cancer and chronic fatigue syndrome cohorts can be explained by the reasonably fast diminution . (2) Monoclonal antibodies (mAbs) have exceptional therapeutic applications in ophthalmology and can be used therapeutically by binding to molecular objects with high specificity. Tumour necrosis factor (TNF), epithelial growth factor receptor, vascular endothelial growth factor (VEGF) receptor, basic fibroblast growth factor receptor, platelet-derived growth factor, and cluster of differentiation antigens repressed by a number of single-agent therapies. Existing and future mAbs in contrast to different cytokines were evaluated for ocular disease treatment and two anti-VEGF mAbs( bevacizumab and ranibizumab), and three anti-TNF agents (infliximab, etanercept, and adalimumab), instruct ocular neovascularization and intraocular inflammation. Other mAbs showed positive results for ocular lymphoma or ocular inflammation but Ranibizumab is the only FDA-approved therapy. Intravenous application of mAbs has established satisfactory toxicity profiles, while intraocular injection may decrease the chances of systemic complications . To develop the excellence and extent of responses is the challenge for the future by merging biologic therapies while lessening side effects. 2i Leading causes of death in the world for coronary syndromes, stroke and other ischaemic arterial diseases . Therapy involves with medical actions correlating thrombolysis, antiplatelet drugs, and the re-opening of the coronary artery by angioplasty. In ischaemic cardiovascular diseases, platelet initiation is a acute phase . Chimeric Fab, c7E3 or abciximab is the only one recombinant antithrombotic antibody currently used in therapy and obstructs the ultimate phase of platelet aggregation. Subendothelium matrix activation by other platelet receptors have been recognized as prospective targets for the improvement of antithrombotic antibodies .2ii In drug development, insulin-like growth factor receptor I (IGF-IR) is becoming an attractive target. IGF-IR owed confined homology to insulin receptor and its specificity permits to distinguish between the two receptors. Recently there are some ongoing on IGF-IR and ongoing clinical trials on anti-IGF-IR monoclonal antibodies and combined treatments. 2iii

Miles Franklins My Brilliant Career Essay -- Franklin My Brilliant Ca

Miles Franklin's My Brilliant Career Topic: Give a detailed analysis of a key scene or passage from "My Brilliant Career" by Miles Franklin. The focus and essence of My Brilliant Career by Miles Franklin is centred on the relationships and interactions of Sybylla Melvyn (the key character of the novel), towards other characters. The ways in which she reacts to different people and why she reacts in a particular manner, are perhaps more crucial and intriguing to the reader, than any distinct event throughout the novel.   Sybylla's logic and thinking about herself, others and life, have been moulded by her very influential relationships with her mother and father.   Her view on life and the roles of men and women has also been influenced by literature she has read.   Moreover, her affinity with her parents in childhood and as a young woman has plainly made its mark on her further relationships, especially with men. The most prominent male relationship Sybylla encounters is with her lover, Harold Beecham.   Sybylla's relationship with Harold as described in Chapter 20 illustrates the influences of her parents and literature.   In   Chapter 20, Sybylla hits Harold across the face with a riding whip, when he tries to kiss her.   Yet Harold Beecham appears to be the perfect figure and the perfect man and indeed, Sybylla loves him, although she does not like to admit this.   For example, her "train of thought was interrupted by our host, who appeared in the doorway, clad from sole to neck in white" (Franklin 137).   He is her knight in shining amour, but even so she strikes him.   To Sybylla, Harold always appears somewhat 'forbidden'.   Perhaps subconsciously, he is the materialised embodiment of her father, Richard Melvyn.   In her e... ...y saying "Is this not rather sudden?   You have given me no intimation of your intentions" (Franklin 140).   Perhaps still disturbed by his manner, this is partly the reason why she hits Harold afterwards. Sybylla Melvyn is simply a confused adolescent, with all the problems and feelings of a young woman growing up.   She has a large amount of emotional turmoil in her mind and is doing what she can to adjust to her ever changing environment.   Sybylla is paranoid and neurotic and her values, beliefs and ideals have been easily influenced by her childhood relationship with her parents.   As a consequence, her actions reflect these influences, which are deeply etched in her mind.   By examining her relationship with Harold Beecham we are able to understand that her attitude towards his affections are a result of both her parents influence and her reading material.  Ã‚     Ã‚  Ã‚  

Elie Wiesels Night :: Elie Wiesel Night Essays

Elie Wiesel's Night      Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   "For more than half an hour he stayed there, struggling between life and death, dying in slow agony under our eyes.   And we had to look him full in the face.   He was still alive when I passed in front of him.   His tongue was still red, his eyes were not yet glazed.   Behind me I heard [a] man asking:   Where is God now?"      Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   The suffering of this child being hanged is comparable to the suffering endured by many Jews during the holocaust.   This quotation is found in just one of many heart wrenching scenes found in Night, a biography of the holocaust survivor, Elie Wiesel.   Wiesel stayed quiet about the holocaust for ten years and his reasoning for this was, "I didn't want to use the wrong words.   I was afraid the words might betray it."   This also may account for the fact that some of the sentences found in Night are very wordy and often are overwhelming to the reader because of the amount of significance found in each.   This flaw, though, is very forgivable under the circumstances.      Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   Besides for the brilliant descriptions found in Night and the feeling that you were walking in Elie's shoes, if he literally had any, Night opens the readers mind to the atrocities of the holocaust and concentration camps.   We take for granted, today, our knowledge of knowing how many Jews were killed by the Nazi's and having a general idea of the kind of life people led in the concentration camps.   People never really stop to think about what it must have felt like not knowing what was going on or what was going to happen next.   Wiesel illustrates this very clearly at the beginning of his autobiography.   He shows the reaction of the townspeople when they first heard of Hitler and German troops and the optimistic approach they ecided to take on life.   This technique of taking the reader to life before the ghettos and the concentration camps is very interesting and unique.   Before reaching about the middle of the novel, the beginning may not really be appreciated.   The reader probably will not realize how much greater the effect is on him/her until he/she notices how much life has changed for

American Tragedy: Self-Destruction in a Self-Indulgent Society Essay ex

American Tragedy: Self-Destruction in a Self-Indulgent Society  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚     "The boy moved restlessly from one foot to the other, keeping his eyes down . . . . [and he] appeared indeed to resent and even to suffer from the position in which he found himself" (p.9). Clyde Griffiths always wanted to be somebody---anyone but who he was. Growing up in a poor home of evangelizing, exhorting missionaries, he was not drawn to God but pushed away from Him and his family. Clyde was looking for a way to escape from his haunting reality to both a place and position in life that were more attractive. He was ashamed of his looks, his attire, his social position and his poor education. American Tragedy (1925) by Theodore Dreiser is the tragic story of a man whose fate is sealed and ambitions are shaped by society's values. Clyde, in trying to fit in with the norms of society, gets into more trouble than he could ever imagine. His trouble begins in Kansas City, where he works at a hotel and runs with some boys who are not all bad, yet are not good either. When these rowdy boys "borrow" a car and pick up their girls for some fun, they hit and kill a little girl. Rather than remain at the scene, they all run. When Clyde finds himself with nowhere to go, he roams until he runs into an old friend from Kansas City. He gets a job at another hotel where he meets his rich uncle. Uncle Samuel tells Clyde that he can come up and get a job in his factory. While working in that factory, he meets Roberta and falls very much in love. However, their love affair must be a secret because he is not, as a department head, supposed to date an employee. As time goes on their relationship becomes physical. In the midst of this physical relationship, Clyde accid... ...ams of getting on and up, was in danger of death. . ." (p.623)! His mother has always known that he is driven to become more like the Griffiths of Lycurgus, but still never imagined that he would become a murderer with this drive. Clyde's desire and ambitions to be something great with the help of society's twisted thinking is what brought about Clyde's demise. The selfish, self-centered thinking of this "high society," and their teaching Clyde these thoughts makes him feel like he has no choice if he wants to obtain his goals. Being corrupted by values which he accepts in order to be successful does nothing more than seal his fate and send him to the electric chair. An American Tragedy is Clyde's story about vice and greed, and the resulting catastrophe.    Bibliography Dreiser, Theodore, An American Tragedy, N.Y., The World Publishing Company, 1953. American Tragedy: Self-Destruction in a Self-Indulgent Society Essay ex American Tragedy: Self-Destruction in a Self-Indulgent Society  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚     "The boy moved restlessly from one foot to the other, keeping his eyes down . . . . [and he] appeared indeed to resent and even to suffer from the position in which he found himself" (p.9). Clyde Griffiths always wanted to be somebody---anyone but who he was. Growing up in a poor home of evangelizing, exhorting missionaries, he was not drawn to God but pushed away from Him and his family. Clyde was looking for a way to escape from his haunting reality to both a place and position in life that were more attractive. He was ashamed of his looks, his attire, his social position and his poor education. American Tragedy (1925) by Theodore Dreiser is the tragic story of a man whose fate is sealed and ambitions are shaped by society's values. Clyde, in trying to fit in with the norms of society, gets into more trouble than he could ever imagine. His trouble begins in Kansas City, where he works at a hotel and runs with some boys who are not all bad, yet are not good either. When these rowdy boys "borrow" a car and pick up their girls for some fun, they hit and kill a little girl. Rather than remain at the scene, they all run. When Clyde finds himself with nowhere to go, he roams until he runs into an old friend from Kansas City. He gets a job at another hotel where he meets his rich uncle. Uncle Samuel tells Clyde that he can come up and get a job in his factory. While working in that factory, he meets Roberta and falls very much in love. However, their love affair must be a secret because he is not, as a department head, supposed to date an employee. As time goes on their relationship becomes physical. In the midst of this physical relationship, Clyde accid... ...ams of getting on and up, was in danger of death. . ." (p.623)! His mother has always known that he is driven to become more like the Griffiths of Lycurgus, but still never imagined that he would become a murderer with this drive. Clyde's desire and ambitions to be something great with the help of society's twisted thinking is what brought about Clyde's demise. The selfish, self-centered thinking of this "high society," and their teaching Clyde these thoughts makes him feel like he has no choice if he wants to obtain his goals. Being corrupted by values which he accepts in order to be successful does nothing more than seal his fate and send him to the electric chair. An American Tragedy is Clyde's story about vice and greed, and the resulting catastrophe.    Bibliography Dreiser, Theodore, An American Tragedy, N.Y., The World Publishing Company, 1953.

Examine the Hindu views on arranged marriages Essay

To what extent can Hindu arranged marriages survive in a multi – cultural society In this essay I will examine the Hindu views on arranged marriages and how they are surviving in s multi – cultural society. I shall use secondary research to back up what I mention within this essay. An arranged marriage is a marriage in which neither the bride nor the groom has a say over the selection of their future spouses. However, in an arranged marriage, both parties give full consent to the marriage. Arranged marriages have been proven to be successful. Arranged marriages have been a traditional aspect of family life in Hinduism. According to Hinduism, a marriage between two people is seen to be a holy relationship, that is just not limited to this one life, but extends across seven or more lives during which, the couple will help each other grow as people and progress spiritually. Two souls come together and marry because their karmas are intertwined and they have to resolve many things together upon earth in order to ensure their mutual salvation. In Hinduism, man and woman represent the two halves of the divine body. There is no question of superiority or inferiority between them. When parents are in search for a partner for their child, they firstly look at the religion, language and caste. These are very important factors that most parents do not overlook for arranged marriages. In India, parents feel that a girl can be a potential wife at the age of eighteen and parents get worried if she remains unmarried past twenty four or twenty five. It is acceptable for a boy to remain unmarried till his late 20s, but after that questions are asked about his appropriateness as a husband. This does not necessarily apply to a growing urban middle class population. Once the families have agreed on their children’s marriage they consult a family priest or an astrologer to fix the wedding date according to their astrological charts and thereafter invitations are sent to family and friends. The Hindu marriage ceremony entails several functions before the â€Å"big day†. However the wedding day itself has many religious rituals which need to be followed and is a custom for all Hindus. Firstly there is the â€Å"Panigrahana†; this ritual is carried out by the bride’s father, where he would offer the hand of the bride to the groom. The next ritual is the exchanging of the vows with fire as the witness. A â€Å"Havankund† or fire is lit and the priest recites the relevant hymns from the scriptures. Each time the bride and groom go around the fire they exchange vows. The next ritual is the â€Å"Saptapadi†; at the end of the ceremony the couple take seven steps together; each step represents strivings for their married life. The first step is taken for God and the growing of their spiritual progress together, the others are for health, wealth, strength, children and happiness. The seventh step represents life long friendship between husband and wife. The other key feature of a Hindu marriage, which everyone is familiar with, is the marking of the bride’s forehead with red powder called â€Å"kumkum†. This merely shows the females status. Love marriages are on the increase in Britain, but there is still a lot of doubt about them amongst the elder generation. Love marriages within the same caste and financial background are favoured, compared to inter-caste and inter-religious marriages. Couples who dare cross the social conventions have to cope with a lot of social pressure within their families and outside. These problems are more acute in the rural areas compared to the urban areas and metropolitan cities. Much depends upon the family background. If parents are educated and enlightened on both sides, things would be easier for the children, who get involved in unconventional relationships. I would say one of the evils of Hindu arranged marriages in India especially is the ever- present dowry system. The amount of dowry can be a very substantial amount, even in dollar terms, depending upon the financial status of the parties involved. Sometimes greedy mother-in-laws and husbands subject the poor brides to innumerable hardships for not meeting their expectations in respect of the dowry. Cases of bride burning are not unknown. Indian penal code prescribes severe punishment for such acts. But the cases take years and decades before the courts deliver justice. Many Indian families who have settled outside of India still uphold the tradition of arranged marriage. Being part of two cultures can be hard. Young people born in Britain but from an Indian family can find this particularly difficult if their modern western lifestyles clash with their parent’s hopes and wishes.2 Many young Indian people living in Britain know that one day they will agree to an arranged marriage. To deny their parents this would be a sign of deep disrespect. Many families are able to discuss the issue and reach compromises that are suitable for everyone. For example insist that you are happy to meet with prospective partners but that you must like your match. Family, friends and relatives will be informed once they have decided to go ahead and soon meetings will be organised. They will be matched according to their education and experience, a suitable caste, or social class associated with the Hindu religion. Many non Hindu’s have a huge misconception about arranged marriages. It is important to make a clear distinction between arranged marriages that are consensual and marriages that are arranged without the consent of the individuals involved. These are sometimes called forced marriages and are against the law in this country. However in rural parts of India this idea about forced marriages still takes place even today. Although Western societies tend to ridicule arranged marriages as backward and uncivilized and old fashioned, there are positive aspects. For example, Westerners focus more on the physical aspect of relationships, and are thus obsessed with love, sex, and beauty. As a result, people get married based on these factors and then get let down by one another very easily. The divorce rate in Western countries such as the U.S. has increased rapidly. â€Å"50% of American marriages end in divorce†1. In contrast, Eastern cultures that practice arranged marriages place far more emphasis on the practical, such as integrity, diligence, ambition, modesty, and kindness. People get married based on practical reasons, and work on building affection later. Strong characteristics like the ones described above are very favourable to building love and affection in Eastern marriages. As a result, these marriages are much longer-lasting than many Western marriages. It is because the primary emphasis is not on love, sex, and physical beauty that arranged marriages are usually so successful, because the spouses get to know one another on a practical level first, looking beyond trivial issues such as beauty. I know it can go both ways, there are many arranged marriages that are just total hell, and there are marriages that started out based only on infatuation and grew stronger as time passed. But I think as long as one looks for the right characteristics in a potential spouse, then, arranged marriage can definitely work. People within the western civilisation are mistaken by the term arranged marriages. Arranged doesn’t necessarily mean â€Å"fixed†. Arranged marriages it encompasses a lot of different varieties: the harshest arranged marriages are almost forced upon the bride or groom while the most liberal ones start with just an introduction of the couple through their parents and the rest is up to the couple. If they feel they are compatible then they would go ahead with the marriage. If they decided not to get married they would remain friends. I feel that within Britain today, Hindu parents have become liberal with their children dating and â€Å"seeing† each other. Parents are now influencing their children to look for someone within University get to know them for at least a couple of years and then decide on whether they are right for you. I think if the parents know about the son or daughter’s partner and they are Hindu, have a good family background and most importantly are educated then the parents would definitely agree to the marriage. In fact, the advantages and drawbacks of arranged marriages cannot be so easily appraised. The incidence of divorce among Indian-born British/Americans is dramatically lower than among British/Americans generally, but that partly reflects the continuing disgrace of divorce. Even as the divorce rate among Indian British/Americans appears to be increasing, the topic is rarely discussed. Divorce reflects poorly on an Indian family, and some proportion of arranged marriages endures not because they are successful or rewarding, but because leaving them would bring such shame. In addition, the concept of a woman living independently is foreign to most people in South Asian culture. Also, a majority of women don’t work in rural areas of South Asian countries and hence find it difficult to have enough money to support them without getting married or after getting divorced. And many endure because the definition of success differs from Western ideas. Traditional Indians don’t expect a partner to be that improbable combination of soul mate/confidante/red-hot lover/best friend. â€Å"The husband-wife bond is one of reliability and dependability and complementary family roles – raising children, caring for elders,† explains Karen Leonard, author of The South Asian Americans and a University of California-Irvine anthropologist. â€Å"They may communicate very little in intimate ways, and it’s still a good marriage.†3. The custom of arranged marriages in India has survived migration and modernization remaining central to the fabric of society. However 95% of all marriages in India are arranged, even among those in the educated middle class. Many Indians challenge that arranged marriages are more successful than marriages in the West, particularly given the latter’s staggering divorce rates. Romantic love does not necessarily lead to a good marriage, and often fails once the passion dissolves, they argue. With most unions between individuals from the same background, the arranged marriage reflects and reinforces the social, economic, geographic and historical diversity of India itself. More like a continent than a country, India is made up of 14 states, with as many languages, thousands of dialects, three major religions, hundreds of sub-religions, an outlawed but still practiced caste system amongst Hindus. The Hindu religion, strongly intertwined in the concept of â€Å"duty,† order that parents are responsible for providing their children’s education and marriage. Once married, their sons take over the running of the household and provide for their parents for the rest of their lives. The arranged marriage has adjusted to modernization. Prospective grooms were once not even allowed to see the photograph of their prospective brides so as to protect an unmarried woman’s purity, her most valuable asset. By the 1930/40’s, such as in my grandmother’s marriage, the couple exchanged photographs, in order to decide if they liked each other. Today couples, depending on how liberal their parents are, have a coffee or meal on their own either at home, or in a restaurant, before deciding to commit. Middle-class women are allowed to reject suitors favoured by their parents. Engagements can now last six months. Western concepts of love triumphing over tradition can be seen in popular Indian films. However, many Indian women in the diaspora are in change. Freedom comes with a price. Some women, after having ended several long term relationships, find themselves in their late 30s alone, with one foot in either world and judged by both. It goes without saying that no marriage, not even an arranged one, is accustomed from basic incompatibility or abuse. But the arranged marriage does have its advantages. Living with the extended family, daughters traditionally live with their in-laws including brothers-in-law and their wives and children which means a free staff of child minders. Apart from the economic savings of a family home, shocks such as a death or the loss of a job can be absorbed. The system cares for elderly parents and grandparents who are generally isolated in Western societies. Also, because the arranged marriage tends to be a union of two families of strong moral and cultural values provides checks and balances against areas that may splinter it, such as unfaithfulness. Most people tend to equate Hindu marriage with arranged marriage. The parents in order to meet this domestic obligation prepare themselves mentally and, more importantly, financially when their child reaches marriageable age. They search for a suitable partner keeping in mind the community â€Å"rules† regarding cast, creed, birth chart, and financial and social status of the family. Traditionally it is the girl’s parents that bear the cost of the wedding and to jumpstart their daughter’s married life they shower her with gifts and ornaments to take to her in-laws. Unfortunately, this has aggravated people’s greed end in the many evils of dowry system. In the end, the discussion of arranged and love marriages comes down to which is better? Obviously, the one that leads to more successful marriages. Supporters of arranged marriages claim that it is more successful, but their definition of success focuses on divorce rates. But are divorce rates really a measure of a successful marriage? Do all the couples that don’t get divorced stay happy with each other? The occurrence of divorce in society depends on a lot of factors including the stigma of divorce. It should be a matter of great concern that we have begun to ignore the ancient and lofty ideals of Hindu marriage and are anxious to follow in the footsteps of cultures that do not value these ideals. No wonder, the number of divorce suits filed by Hindu couples is on the rise. Instead of strengthening the traditional ideals, which for thousands of years have helped us prevent marriage and family break-ups, we are misdirecting our energies towards promoting the ideal of sense-enjoyment and self-interest. In my opinion it is still not too late to be proactive to protect the sanctity of Hindu marriage. 1: http://www.religioustolerance.org/chr_dira.htm 2: http://www.youthinformation.com/infopage.asp?snID=805 3: http://lair.xent.com/pipermail/fork/2003-March/018427.html Words – 2,582 (not including Bibliography)

Changing Media, Changing China

changing media, changing china This page intentionally left blank CHANGING MEDIA, CHANGING CHINA Edited by Susan L. Shirk 2011 Oxford University Press, Inc. , publishes works that further Oxford University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education. Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine VietnamCopyright  © 2011 by Susan L. Shirk Published by Oxford University Press, Inc. 198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016 www. oup. com Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Changing media, changing China / edited by Susan L. Shirk. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN 978-0-19-975198-3; 978-0-19-975197-6 (pbk. ) 1. Mass media—China. 2. Mass media and culture—China. I. Shirk, Susan L. P92. C5C511 2010 302. 230951—dc22 2010012025 1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper Contents 1. Changing Media, Changing China 1 Susan L. Shirk 2. China’s Emerging Public Sphere: The Impact of Media Commercialization, Professionalism, and the Internet in an Era of Transition 38 Qian Gang and David Bandurski 3. The Rise of the Business Media in China Hu Shuli 4. Between Propaganda and Commercials: Chinese Television Today 91 Miao Di 5.Environmental Journalism in China Zhan Jiang 115 77 6. Engineering Human Souls: The Development of Chinese Military Journali sm and the Emerging Defense Media Market 128 Tai Ming Cheung 7. Changing Media, Changing Courts 150 Benjamin L. Liebman 8. What Kind of Information Does the Public Demand? Getting the News during the 2005 Anti-Japanese Protests 175 Daniela Stockmann 9. The Rise of Online Public Opinion and Its Political Impact 202 Xiao Qiang 10. Changing Media, Changing Foreign Policy Susan L. Shirk Acknowledgments 253 Contributors 255 Index 259 225 vi Content 1 Changing Media, Changing China Susan L.Shirk ver the past thirty years, the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have relinquished their monopoly over the information reaching the public. Beginning in 1979, they allowed newspapers, magazines, and television and radio stations to support themselves by selling advertisements and competing in the marketplace. Then in 1993, they funded the construction of an Internet network. The economic logic of these decisions was obvious: requiring mass media organizations to ? nance their operations through commercial activities would reduce the government’s burden and help modernize China’s economy.And the Internet would help catapult the country into the ranks of technologically advanced nations. But less clear is whether China’s leaders anticipated the profound political repercussions that would follow. This collection of essays explores how transformations in the information environment—stimulated by the potent combination of commercial media and Internet—are changing China. The essays are written by Western China experts, as well as by pioneering journalists and experts from China, who write from personal experience about how television, newspapers, magazines, and Web-based news sites navigate the sometimes treacherous crosscurrentsO between the market and CCP controls. Although they involve different types of media, the essays share common themes and subjects: the explosion of information made available to the public through market-orie nted and Internet-based news sources; how people seek credible information; how the population—better informed than ever before—is making new demands on government; how officials react to these demands; the ambivalence of the leadership as to the bene? s and risks of the free ? ow of information, as well as their instinctive and strenuous efforts to shape public opinion by controlling content; and the ways in which journalists and Netizens are evading and resisting these controls. Following a brief retrenchment after the Tiananmen crackdown on student demonstrators in June 1989, the commercialization of the mass media picked up steam in the 1990s. 1 Today, newspapers, magazines, television stations, and news Web sites compete ? rcely for audiences and advertising revenue. After half a century of being force-fed CCP propaganda and starved of real information about domestic and international events, the Chinese public has a voracious appetite for news. This appetite is m ost apparent in the growth of Internet access and the Web,2 which have multiplied the amount of information available, the variety of sources, the timeliness of the news, and the national and international reach of the news.China has more than 384 million Internet users, more than any other country, and an astounding 145 million bloggers. 3 The most dramatic effect of the Internet is how fast it can spread information, which in turn helps skirt official censorship. Because of its speed, the Internet is the ? rst place news appears; it sets the agenda for other media. Chinese Internet users learn almost instantaneously about events happening overseas and throughout China.Thanks to the major news Web sites that compile articles from thousands of sources, including television, newspapers and magazines, and online publications like blogs, and disseminate them widely, a toxic waste site or corruption scandal in any Chinese city or a politician’s speech in Tokyo or Washington becom es headline news across the country. Other complementary technologies, such as cell phones, amplify the impact of the Internet. Millions of people get news bulletins text messaged automatically to their cell phones. China is nonetheless still a long way from having a free press.As of 2008, China stood close to the bottom of world rankings of freedom of the press— 181 out of 195 countries—as assessed by the international nongovernmental organization (NGO) Freedom House. 4 Freedom House also gives a low 2 Changing Media, Changing China score to China’s Internet freedom—78 on a scale from 1 to 100, with 100 being the worst. 5 The CCP continues to monitor, censor, and manufacture the content of the mass media—including the Web—although at a much higher cost and less thoroughly than before the proliferation of news sources.During President Hu Jintao’s second term, which began in 2007, the party ramped up its efforts to manage this new info rmation environment. What at ? rst looked like temporary measures to prevent destabilizing protests in the lead-up to the 2008 Olympics and during the twentieth anniversary of the Tiananmen crackdown and other political anniversaries in 2009 now seem to have become a permanent strategy. Apparently the CCP will do whatever it takes to make sure that the information reaching the public through the commercial media and the Internet does not inspire people to challenge party rule.Information management has become a source of serious friction in China’s relations with the United States and other Western countries. In 2010, Google, reacting to cyber attacks originating in China and the Chinese government’s intensi? ed controls over free speech on the Internet, threatened to pull out of the country unless it was allowed to operate an un? ltered Chinese language search engine. 6 (Beijing had required Google to ? lter out material the Chinese government considers politically se nsitive as a condition of doing business in China. Nine days later, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, in a speech about the Internet and freedom of speech that had been planned before Google’s announcement and that did not focus on China or the Google controversy, articulated Internet freedom as an explicit goal of American foreign policy. 7 The Chinese government was stunned and alarmed by the Google announcement. Google’s challenge did not just sully China’s international reputation; it also threatened to mobilize a dangerous domestic backlash. A senior propaganda official I interviewed expressed dismay that Google executives had made a high-pro? e threat instead of using the â€Å"good relationship† the Propaganda Department had established with company executives. A Beijing academic heard a senior official say that the government was treating the Google crisis as â€Å"the digital version of June 4,† referring to the Tiananmen crisis, which a lmost brought down Communist Party rule in 1989. In the ? rst twenty-four hours after Google’s dramatic statement, angry and excited Netizens crowded into chat rooms to applaud Google’s defense Changing Media, Changing China 3 of free information.Google has only a 25–30 percent share of the search engine business in China—the Chinese-owned Baidu has been favored by the government and most consumers—but Google is strongly preferred by the members of the highly educated urban elite. 8 To prevent the controversy from stirring up opposition from this in? uential group, the Propaganda Department went to work. Overnight, the dominant opinion appearing on the Internet turned 180 degrees against Google and the United States. 9 The pro-Google messages disappeared and were replaced by accusations against the U.S. government for colluding with Google to subvert Chinese sovereignty through its â€Å"information imperialism,† thereby creating suspicions that many of the new postings were bogus. The Propaganda Department asked respected Chinese academics to submit supportive newspaper essays, and provided ghostwriters. Online news portals were required to devote space on their front pages to the government’s counterattacks. To defend itself against the threat of a large-scale movement of Google devotees, the CCP fell back on anti-American nationalism.In March 2010 Google followed through on its threat and moved its search engine to Hong Kong; as a result, the Chinese government and not Google now does the ? ltering. Despite the unique features of the Google case, international as well as domestic con? icts over censorship are likely to be repeated as the party struggles to shape an increasingly pluralistic information environment. In her book Media Control in China, originally published in 2004 by the international NGO Human Rights in China, journalist He Qinglian lambasts the CCP for its limits on press freedom. She describe s Chinese journalists as â€Å"dancing in shackles. Yet she also credits commercialization with â€Å"opening a gap in the Chinese government’s control of the news media. †10 Indeed, the competition for audiences provides a strong motivation for the press to break a news story before the propaganda authorities can implement a ban on reporting it—and it has provided an unprecedented space for protest, as was seen in the initial wave of pro-Google commentary. Caught between commercialization and control, journalists play a cat and mouse game with the censors, a dynamic that is vividly depicted in the case studies in this book.Even partially relinquishing control of the mass media transforms the strategic interaction between rulers and the public in authoritarian political systems like China. Foreigners tend to dwell on the way the Chinese propaganda cops are continuing to censor the media, but an equally important 4 Changing Media, Changing China part of the stor y is the exponential expansion of the amount of information available to the public and how this is changing the political game within China. That change is the subject of this book.OFFICIAL AMBIVALENCE As journalist Qian Gang and his coauthor David Bandurski argue in chapter 2, Chinese leaders have a â€Å"deep ambivalence† toward the commercial media and the Internet: they recognize its potential bene? ts as well as its risks. Xiao Qiang, in chapter 9, uses the same term to describe the attitude of Chinese authorities toward the Internet. By choosing to give up some degree of control over the media, the rulers of authoritarian countries like China make a trade-off. Most obviously, they gain the bene? t of economic development; the market operates more efficiently when people have better information.But they also are gambling that they will reap political bene? ts; that relinquishing control of the media will set off a dynamic that will result in the improvement of the gover nment’s performance and ultimately, they hope, in strengthening its popular support. The media improve governance by providing more accurate information regarding the preferences of the public to policymakers. National leaders also use media as a watchdog to monitor the actions of subordinate officials, particularly at the local level, so they can identify and try to ? x problems before they provoke popular unrest.Competition from the commercial media further drives the official media and the government itself to become more transparent; to preserve its credibility, the government must release more information than it ever did before. In all these ways, the transformed media environment improves the responsiveness and transparency of governance. Additionally, a freer press can help earn international approval. On the other hand, surrendering control over information creates severe political risks. It puts new demands on the government that it may not be able to satisfy, and i t could reveal to the public the divisions behind the facade of party unity.Diminished control also provides an opening for political opposition to emerge. What most worries CCP leaders—and what motivates them to continue investing heavily in mechanisms to control media content—is the potential that a free information environment provides for organizing a challenge to their rule. The Chinese leaders’ fear of Changing Media, Changing China 5 free-? owing information is not mere paranoia; some comparative social science research indicates that allowing â€Å"coordination goods† like press freedom and civil liberties signi? antly reduces the odds for authoritarian regimes to survive in power. 11 What is the connection between information and antigovernment collective action? The more repressive a regime, the more dangerous it is to coordinate and engage in collective action to change that regime. Each individual dares to participate only if the risk of parti cipating is outweighed by the potential bene? ts. One way to minimize the risk is the anonymity afforded by large numbers. Standing on Tiananmen Square carrying an antiregime sign is an act of political suicide if you are alone.It only makes sense to demonstrate if you know that a crowd will turn out. Even before the Internet was created, news stories could create focal points for mobilizing mass protests. Cell phones and the Internet are even more useful for coordinating group action as they provide anonymity to the organizers and facilitate two-way communication of many to many. In April 1999, approximately ten thousand devotees of the Falun Gong spiritual sect used cell phones and the Internet to secretly organize a sit-in that surrounded the CCP and government leadership compound in Beijing.A decade before, the fax machine was the communication technology that made it possible for students to organize pro-democracy protests in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square and more than 130 other cities. As the chapters in this book detail, in recent years a combination of newspaper reports, Internet communication tools, and cell phones has enabled student protests against Japan, demonstrations against rural land seizures, and protests against environmentally damaging industrial projects.The political possibilities of the latest social networking technologies like Twitter (a homegrown Chinese version is FanFou), Facebook (a Chinese version is Xiaonei), or the videosharing program YouTube (a Chinese version is Youku) have yet to be fully tested in China. 12 As Michael Suk-Young Chwe points out in his book Rational Ritual, media communication and other elements of culture make coordination possible by creating â€Å"common knowledge† that gives each person the knowledge that others have received the same message. 3 When all news was communicated through official media, it was used to mobilize support for CCP policies: hence, the CCP had few worries about popular o pposition. Thomas Schelling made this point with a characteristically apt analogy: â€Å"The participants of a square dance may all be thoroughly dissatis? ed with 6 Changing Media, Changing China the particular dances being called, but as long as the caller has the microphone, nobody can dance anything else. †14 As the number and variety of microphones have increased, so have the force of public opinion and the risk of bottom-up mass action.The CCP propaganda authorities may have been reading Schelling: A June 2009 People’s Daily commentary titled â€Å"The Microphone Era† says, â€Å"In this Internet era, everyone can be an information channel and a principal of opinion expression. A ? gurative comparison is that everybody now has a microphone in front of him. †15 Examples like the 2009 antigovernment protests in Iran and the so-called color revolutions in former Soviet states, as well as their own experiences, make Chinese politicians afraid that the f ree ? ow of information through the new media could threaten their rule.But it is worth considering the other possibility, namely, that the Internet might actually impede a successful revolutionary movement because venting online is a safer option than taking to the streets; and the decentralized nature of online communication splinters movements instead of integrating them into effective revolutionary organizations. 16 Nevertheless, China’s leaders are too nervous to risk completely ceding control of information. MASS MEDIA IN TOTALITARIAN CHINA In the prereform era, China had no journalism as we know it, only propaganda.Highly conscious of public opinion, the CCP devoted a huge amount of resources to managing popular views of all issues. 17 In CCP lingo, the media were called the â€Å"throat and tongue† of the party; their sole purpose was to mobilize public support by acting as loudspeakers for CCP policies. 18 The Chinese public received all of its highly homogeno us information from a small number of officially controlled sources. As of 1979, there were only sixty-nine newspapers in the entire country, all run by the party and government. 9 The standard template consisted of photos and headlines glorifying local and national leaders on the front page, and invariably positive reports written in formulaic, ideological prose inside. Local news stories of interest such as ? res or crimes were almost never reported. What little foreign news was provided had to be based on the dispatches of the government’s Xinhua News Agency. People read the People’s Daily and other official newspapers in the morning at work— offices and factories were required to have subscriptions.The 7 p. m. news on Changing Media, Changing China 7 China Central Television (CCTV) simply rehashed what had been in the People’s Daily. 20 Newspaper editorials and commentaries were read aloud by strident voices over ubiquitous radio loudspeakers and then used as materials for obligatory political study sessions in the workplace. A steady diet of propaganda depoliticized the public. As political scientist Ithiel de Sola Pool observed, â€Å"When regimes impose daily propaganda in large doses, people stop listening. 21 CCP members, government officials, and politically sophisticated intellectuals, however, had to remain attentive. To get the information they needed to do their jobs—and to survive during the campaigns to criticize individuals who had made ideological mistakes that periodically swept through the bureaucracies—the elite deciphered the coded language of the official media by reading between the lines. Sometimes this esoteric communication was intended as a signal from the top CCP leaders to subordinates about an impending change in the official line. 2 Kremlinology and Pekinology developed into a high art not only in foreign intelligence agencies, but also within Soviet and Chinese government circles thems elves. In chapter 8, Daniela Stockmann describes survey research that she completed which shows that government officials and people who work with the government continue to read the official press to track policy trends. A diet consisting solely of official propaganda left people craving trustworthy sources of information. 23 As in all totalitarian states, a wide information gap divided the top leaders from the public.Senior officials enjoyed ample access to the international media and an extensive system of internal intelligence gathered by news organizations and other bureaucracies (called neican in Chinese). But the vast majority of the public was left to rely on rumors picked up at the teahouse and personal observations of their neighborhoods and workplaces. (In modern democracies, the information gap between officialdom and the public has disappeared almost entirely: U. S. government officials keep television sets on in their offices and learn about international events ? st f rom CNN, not from internal sources. ) MEDIA REFORM Beginning in the early 1980s, the structure of Chinese media changed. Newspapers, magazines, and television stations received cuts in their government subsidies and were driven to enter the market and to earn revenue. 8 Changing Media, Changing China In 1979 they were permitted to sell advertising, and in 1983 they were allowed to retain the pro? ts from the sale of ads. Because people were eager for information and businesses wanted to advertise their products, pro? ts were good and the number of publications grew rapidly.As Qian Gang and David Bandurski note in chapter 2, the commercialization of the media accelerated after 2000 as the government sought to strengthen Chinese media organizations to withstand competition from foreign media companies. By 2005, China published more than two thousand newspapers and nine thousand magazines. 24 In 2003, the CCP eliminated mandatory subscriptions to official newspapers and ended subsidies to all but a few such papers in every province. Even nationally circulated, official papers like People’s Daily, Guangming Daily, and Economics Daily are now sold at retail stalls and compete for audiences.According to their editors, Guangming Daily sells itself as â€Å"a spiritual homeland for intellectuals†; Economics Daily markets its timely economic reports; and the People’s Daily promotes its authoritativeness. 25 About a dozen commercial newspapers with national circulations of over 1 million readers are printed in multiple locations throughout the country. The southern province of Guangdong is the headquarters of the cutting-edge commercial media, with three newspaper groups ? ercely competing for audiences. Nanjing now has ? e newspapers competing for the evening readership. People buy the new tabloids and magazines on the newsstands and read them at home in the evening. Though almost all of these commercial publications are part of media groups led by party or government newspapers, they look and sound completely different. In contrast to the stilted and formulaic language of official publications, the language of the commercial press is lively and colloquial. Because of this difference in style, people are more apt to believe that the content of commercial media is true.Daniela Stockmann’s research shows that consumers seek out commercial publications because they consider them more credible than their counterparts from the official media. According to her research, even in Beijing, which has a particularly large proportion of government employees, only about 36 percent of residents read official papers such as the People’s Daily; the rest read only semiofficial or commercialized papers. Advertisers and many of the commercial media groups target young and middle-aged urbanites who are well-educated, affluent consumers.But publications also seek to differentiate themselves and appeal to speci? c Changing Media, Cha nging China 9 audiences. The Guangdong-based publications use domestic muckraking to attract a business-oriented, cosmopolitan audience. Because they push the limits on domestic political reporting—their editors are ? red and replaced frequently—they have built an audience of liberal-minded readers outside Guangdong Province. According to its editors, Southern Weekend (Nanfang Zhoumo), published by the Nanfang Daily group under the Guangdong Communist Party Committee, considered one of the most critical and politically in? ential commercial newspapers, has a larger news bureau and greater circulation in politically charged Beijing than it does in southern China. 26 The Communist Youth League’s popular national newspaper, China Youth Journal, has been a commercial success because it appeals to China’s yuppies, the style-conscious younger generation with money to spend. The national foreign affairs newspaper, Global Times, tries to attract the same demograp hic by its often sensational nationalistic reporting of international affairs, as I discuss in chapter 10.Media based out of Shanghai, the journalistic capital of China before the communist victory in 1949, are comparatively â€Å"very dull and quiet,† according to Chinese media critics. The cause they cite is that the city’s government has been slow to relinquish control. 27 Shanghai audiences prefer Southern Weekend, Global Times, and Nanjing’s Yangtze Evening News to Shanghai-based papers, and Hunan television to their local stations. 28 Journalists now think of themselves as professionals instead of as agents of the government.Along with all the other changes referred to above, this role change began in the late 1970s. Chinese journalists started to travel, study abroad, and encounter â€Å"real† journalists. The crusading former editor in chief of the magazine Caijing (Finance and Economy) and author of chapter 3, Hu Shuli, recalls that before commer cialization, â€Å"the news media were regarded as a government organization rather than a watchdog, and those who worked with news organizations sounded more like officials than professional journalists. But] our teachers . . . encouraged us to pursue careers as professional journalists. †29 Media organizations now compete for the best young talent, and outstanding journalists have been able to bid up their salaries by changing jobs frequently. Newspapers and magazines are also recruiting and offering high salaries to bloggers who have attracted large followings. Yet most journalists still receive low base salaries and are paid by the article, which makes them susceptible to corruption.Corruption ranges from small transportation subsidies and â€Å"honoraria† provided to reporters for coverage of government and corporate news conferences to outright 10 Changing Media, Changing China corporate bribery for positive reporting and extortion of corporations by journalists threatening to write damaging exposes (see chapter 3). Establishing professional journalistic ethics is as difficult in China’s Wild West version of early capitalism as it was in other countries at a similar stage of development. Some journalists also have crossed over to political advocacy.In one unprecedented collective act, the national Economic Observer and twelve regional newspapers in March 2010 published a sharply worded joint editorial calling on China’s legislature, the National People’s Congress, to abolish the system of household residential permits (hukou) that forces migrants from the countryside to live as second-class citizens in the cities. 30 The authorities banned dissemination and discussion of the editorial but only after it had received wide distribution. At the legislative session, government leaders proposed some reforms of the hukou system, but not its abolition as demanded by the editorial.MEDIA FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT CONTROL All authori tarian governments face hard choices about how much effort and resources to invest in controlling various forms of media. In China, as in many other nondemocracies, television is the most tightly controlled. As Chinese television expert Miao Di explains in chapter 4, â€Å"because of television’s great in? uence on the public today—it is the most important source of information for the majority of the population, reaching widely into rural as well as urban areas—it remains the most tightly controlled type of medium in China by propaganda departments at all administrative levels. All television stations are owned by national, provincial, municipal or county governments and used for propaganda purposes. Yet television producers must pay attention to ratings and audiences if they want to earn advertising revenue. As Miao Di puts it, â€Å"television today is like a doublegendered rooster: propaganda departments want it to crow while ? nance departments want it to lay eggs. † The way most television producers reconcile these competing objectives is to â€Å"produce leisurely and ‘harmless’ entertainment programs,† not hard news or commentary programs.Yet exceptions exist; Hunan television has found a niche with a lively nightly news show that eliminates the anchor and is reported directly by no-necktie journalists. Changing Media, Changing China 11 In the print realm, the government controls entry to the media market by requiring every publication (including news Web sites with original content) to have a license and by limiting the number of licenses. Only a handful of newspapers, magazines, and news Web sites are completely independent and privately ? nanced. The rest may have some private ? ancing but remain as part of media groups headed by an official publication and subordinate to a government or CCP entity that is responsible for the news content and appoints the chief editors. The chief editor of Global Time s, appointed by the editors and CCP committee of People’s Daily, acknowledged this in my interview with him: â€Å"If we veer too far away from the general direction of the upper level, I will get ? red. I know that. † However, there is a degree of variation. For example, magazines are somewhat more loosely controlled than newspapers, presumably because they appear less frequently and have smaller readerships.Additionally, newspapers focusing on economics and business appear to be allowed wider latitude in what they can safely report. The publication that set a new standard for bold muckraking journalism is Caijing (Finance and Economics), a privately ? nanced independent biweekly business magazine with a relatively small, elite readership. In chapter 3, former Caijing editor in chief Hu Shuli explains that â€Å"the Chinese government’s control of the economic news arena, both in terms of licensing and supervision, has been relatively loose when compared with control over other news . . [so much so that] even in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square event of 1989, economic news was little affected by censorship, while all other kinds of news were strictly monitored and controlled. † Her analysis of the emergence of ? nancial journalism in China recognizes the pathbreaking role of private entrepreneurs and professional journalists, but also credits the â€Å"reform-minded economic officials† who appreciate the importance of a free ? w of information for the effective functioning of a market economy. She notes that these economic officials didn’t call out the CCP Propaganda Department even when Caijing broke an embarrassing scandal about the Bank of China’s IPO in Hong Kong at the very time when the National People’s Congress was holding its annual meeting; this is considered a politically sensitive period during which the propaganda authorities usually ban all bad news. Evan Osnos, in his New Yorker pro? e of Hu Shuli, observes that the differences among senior officials on media policy may protect Caijing; the magazine â€Å"had gone so far already that conservative branches of the government could no longer be sure which other officials supported it. †31 12 Changing Media, Changing China In 2010, Hu Shuli and most of the staff of Caijing resigned in a con? ict with the magazine’s owners over editorial control and established Caixin Media, which publishes a weekly news magazine (Century Weekly), a monthly economic review (China Reform), and a Web site (Caing. com). Caixin is the ? st media organization in China to establish a Board of Trustees to safeguard its journalistic integrity. Caijing, its reputation damaged by the mass exodus of its journalists, is seeking to recoup by publishing exciting stories such as one that urged that Hubei governor Li Hongzhong be ? red if he failed to apologize for ripping a journalist’s tape recorder out of her hand when she ch allenged him at a press conference with a question he didn’t like. 32 The heated competition between the two media groups is likely to drive them to venture beyond business journalism with taboo-breaking stories that test the tolerance of the government.Although China’s leaders have embraced the Internet as a necessary element of the information infrastructure for a modern economy, as the size of the online public has grown, they have invested more and more heavily in controlling online content and containing its powerful potential to mobilize political opposition. The Internet offers individuals the means to learn about fast-breaking events inside and outside China, to write and disseminate their own commentaries, and to coordinate collective action like petitions, boycotts, and protests.The concept of the Netizen (wangmin) is laden with political meaning in a system lacking other forms of democratic participation. 33 As Xiao Qiang, the UC Berkeley–based editor of China Digital Times, observes in chapter 9, â€Å"The role of the Internet as a communications tool is especially meaningful in China where citizens previously had little to no opportunity for unconstrained public self-expression or access to free and uncensored information.Furthermore, these newfound freedoms have developed in spite of stringent government efforts to control the medium. † From the standpoint of the CCP leaders, the Internet is the most potent media threat. Young and well-educated city dwellers, whose loyalty is crucial for the survival of CCP rule, ? ock to the Internet for information, including information from abroad. 34 That is why the CCP reacted so defensively to the Google showdown and ? rmly refuses to permit un? ltered searches.Additionally, the Internet’s capability for many-to-many two-way communication facilitates the coordination of collective action around the common knowledge of online information. There is no way for CCP leaders to predict whether virtual activism will serve as a harmless outlet for venting or a means to mobilize antigovernment protests in the street. Changing Media, Changing China 13 Government controls include the â€Å"Great Firewall,† which can block entire sites located abroad and inside China and ingenious technological methods to ? ter and inhibit searches for keywords considered subversive. But as Xiao Qiang notes in chapter 9, â€Å"the government’s primary strategy is to hold Internet service providers and access providers responsible for the behavior of their customers, so business operators have little choice but to proactively censor content on their sites. † In addition, human monitors are paid to manually censor content. Ever since the Mao Zedong era, the methods used by CCP leaders to inculcate political loyalty and ideological conformity have re? cted an acute awareness that peer groups have a more powerful impact on individual attitudes than authority ? gures. It is for this reason that every Chinese citizen was required to undergo regular criticism and self-criticism in small groups of classmates or coworkers. Today’s propaganda officials are applying this insight to their management of the information environment created on the Internet. To augment its censorship methods and neutralize online critics, the CCP has introduced a system of paid Internet commentators called the Fifty-Cent Army (wu mao dang).Individuals are paid approximately ? fty cents in Chinese currency for each anonymous message they post that endorses the government’s position on controversial issues. Local propaganda and Youth League officials are particularly keen to adopt this technique. 35 These messages create the impression that the tide of social opinion supports the government, put social and psychological pressure to conform on people with critical views, and thereby presumably reduce the possibility of antigovernment collective action.The July 2009 regulation that bans news Web sites from conducting online polls on current events and requires Netizens to use their real names when posting reactions on these sites appears to have the same aim of disrupting antigovernment common knowledge from forming on the Internet. 36 The large commercial news Web sites Sina. com, Sohu. com, and Netease. com are probably the second most widely used source of information in China after television, and the ? rst place better-educated people go for their news.These sites have agreements with almost every publication in China (including some blogs) and many overseas news organizations that allow them to compile and reproduce their content and make it available to millions of readers. They are privately owned and listed on NASDAQ , but they are politically compliant, behaving more or less like arms of the government. To keep their privileged monopoly status, they cooperate closely with the State Council Information Office, which sends the managers of the 14 Changing Media, Changing China Web sites SMS text messages several times a day with â€Å"guidance† on which topics to avoid.The Information Office also provides a list of particularly independent publications that are not supposed to be featured on the front page. The news sites have opted to reduce their political risks by posting only hard news material that has ? rst been published elsewhere in China. Although they produce original content about such topics as entertainment, sports, and technology, they never do so with respect to news events. Furthermore, with very rare exceptions, such as the 9/11 attacks, they never publish international media accounts of news events directly on the site.Despite the CCP hovering over it, the Internet constitutes the most freewheeling media space in China because the speed and decentralized structure of online communication present an insuperable obstacle to the censors. In Xiao Qiang’s words from chapter 9, à ¢â‚¬Å"When one deals with the blogosphere and the whole Internet with its redundant connections, millions of overlapping clusters, self-organized communities, and new nodes growing in an explosive fashion, total control is nearly impossible. † In the short time before a posting can be deleted by a monitor, Netizens circulate it far and wide so it becomes widely known.For example, speeches from foreign leaders, like President Obama’s inaugural address, are carefully excerpted on television and in newspapers to cast China in the most positive light. Yet on the Internet you can ? nd the full, unedited version if you are motivated to search for it. There is no longer any hope for authorities to prevent the possibly objectionable statements about China by politicians in Washington, Tokyo, or Taipei, or the cell phone videos and photographs of violent protests in Lhasa or Urumqi, from reaching and arousing reactions from the online public.Once news attracts attention on the I nternet, the audienceseeking commercial media are likely to pick it up as well. Xiao Qiang argues that â€Å"the rise of online public opinion shows that the CCP and government can no longer maintain absolute control of the mass media and information,† and that the result is a â€Å"power shift in Chinese society. † HOW ARE THE COMMERCIAL MEDIA AND INTERNET CHANGING CHINESE POLITICS? Like all politicians, Chinese leaders are concerned ? rst and foremost about their own survival. A rival leader could try to oust them.A mass protest movement could rise up and overthrow them, especially if a rival leader Changing Media, Changing China 15 reaches out beyond the inner circle to lead such a movement. If leaders lose the support of the military, the combination of an elite split and an opposition movement could defeat them. The trauma of 1989 came close to doing just that. Thousands of Chinese students demonstrated in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square and over 130 other citie s, and CCP leaders disagreed on how to handle the demonstrations.The CCP’s rule might have ended had the military refused to obey leader Deng Xiaoping’s order to use lethal force to disperse the demonstrators. In that same year, democracy activists brought down the Berlin Wall, and communist regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe began to crumble. No wonder that since 1989, China’s leaders have worried that their own days in power are numbered. Because commercial journalism was still in its infancy and the Internet had not yet been built, the mass media played a more minor role in the 1989 crisis than it has since then.During the crisis, students, frustrated by what they considered the biased slant of the official press, spread the word about their movement by giving interviews to the foreign press and sending faxes abroad. One market-oriented publication, the World Economic Herald, based in Shanghai, faced down Jiang Zemin, then the party secretary of t he city, and published uncensored reports. The restive journalists at the People’s Daily and other official papers, with the blessing of some liberal-minded officials in the Propaganda Department, reported freely on the student movement for a few days in May.The Communist Party leaders were almost as worried about the journalists’ rebellion as they were about the students’ one. 37 After the crackdown, party conservatives closed down several liberal newspapers including the World Economic Herald and blamed the crisis in part on the loosening controls over the press that had been introduced by former leaders Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang. 38 Since Tiananmen, Chinese leaders have paid close attention to the destabilizing potential of the media.The formula for political survival that they adopted, based on their 1989 experience, focuses on three key tasks:39 †¢ Prevent large-scale social unrest †¢ Avoid public leadership splits †¢ Keep the military loyal to the CCP The three dicta are interconnected: if the leadership group remains cohesive despite the competition that inevitably arises within it, then the CCP and the security police can keep social unrest from spreading out of control 16 Changing Media, Changing China and the government will survive.Unless people receive some signal of permission from the top, protests will be suppressed or ? zzle out before they grow politically threatening. But if the divisions among the top leaders come into the open as they did in 1989, people will take to the streets with little fear of punishment. Moreover, were the military leadership to split or abandon the CCP, the entire regime could collapse. Though commercialization of the media and growth of the Internet have consequences across all three dimensions, today their effects are felt primarily in the efforts to prevent large-scale social unrest.As the chapters in this book describe, the media and Internet are changing the strategic interac tions between leaders and the public as the leaders struggle to head off unrest and maintain popular support. WATCHDOG JOURNALISM: HOW TO REACT WHEN THE DOG BARKS As noted earlier, the politicians at the top of the CCP are of two minds about whether the media and Internet prevent or encourage large-scale social unrest. On the positive side, the media and Internet provide information on problems so that national leaders can address them before they cause crises.But on the negative side, the market-oriented media and Internet have the subversive effect of facilitating collective action that could turn against CCP rule. The elite’s extreme nervousness about potential protests makes them highly responsive when the media report on a problem. The pressure to react is much greater than it was in the prereform era when the elite relied entirely on con? dential internal reporting within the bureaucracy to learn about problems on the ground. Once the media publicize an issue and the is sue becomes common knowledge, then the government does not dare ignore it.Chinese journalists take particular pride in exposes that actually lead to improved governance and changes in policy. One of the earliest and best examples was the reporting about the 2003 death in detention of Sun Zhigang, a young college graduate who had migrated to Guangdong from his native Hubei Province. Qian Gang and David Bandurski, as well as Benjamin Liebman, describe in chapters 2 and 7 how the initial newspaper story published by the Southern Metropolis Daily, a bold Guangdong commercial newspaper, circulated Changing Media, Changing China 7 throughout the country on the major news Web sites and transformed Sun’s death into a cause celebre that sparked an emotional outpouring online. This emotional outpouring in turn inspired a group of law students to take the issue of the detention and repatriation of migrants directly to the National People’s Congress. Only two months after the ? rs t article, Premier Wen Jiabao signed a State Council order abolishing the practice of detaining migrants who did not carry a special identi? ation card and shipping them back to their homes. Although such instances of actual change in policy are rare, public apologies by high-level officials in response to media criticism are becoming more common. In 2001, Premier Zhu Rongji became the ? rst PRC leader to apologize to the public for a cover-up when he took responsibility for an explosion that killed forty-seven children and staff in a rural school where the students were manufacturing ? reworks.Premier Zhu initially had endorsed the far-fetched explanation offered by the local officials of a deranged suicide bomber. But when, despite a blackout of the Chinese media, the accounts of Hong Kong and foreign journalists who had interviewed villagers by telephone spread in China over the Internet, Premier Zhu offered his apology in a televised press conference. 40 Premier Wen Jiabao has f ollowed the example of his predecessor. He apologized for the melamine-tainted milk and infant formula that killed six and sickened hundreds of thousands of babies.The massive food safety story was originally suppressed by propaganda authorities in the lead-up to the 2008 Olympics, but the scandal was broken by the local press in Gansu Province and the official Xinhua News Service following the games. Premier Wen also apologized for the crippling snowstorms in January 2008 that stranded millions of Chinese eager to get home for the Spring Festival break. To de? ect blame and show how responsive it is to media revelations of official negligence or malfeasance, the central government also has sacked the senior officials implicated in such scandals.The number of such highpro? le ? rings or resignations has increased over the past decade with the growth of investigative journalism. Several good examples are described in this book. Increasingly, officials at all levels are making a consp icuous show of their receptiveness to online public opinion. They publicize their chats with Netizens. Government agencies have opened up Web sites for citizens’ petitions. Law enforcement officers have starting inviting Netizens to provide infor18 Changing Media, Changing China mation for their criminal investigations.In one case, a creative local propaganda official who was a former Xinhua reporter invited a number of bloggers to join a commission investigating the suspicious death of a prisoner. The bloggers had ridiculed as implausible the police’s explanation that the prisoner had walked into the cell wall during a blindman’s bluff game among the prisoners; they thought police brutality must be the explanation. The debate died down after the commission released a report that said they knew too little to conclude what had happened and the provincial prosecutors announced the prisoner had not died during a game but had been beaten by another prisoner.The offi cial proudly explained that he had defused the issue by showing that â€Å"public opinion on the Internet must be solved by means of the Internet. †41 MONITORING LOCAL OFFICIALS Every government needs information about how its officials are performing their jobs in order to effectively implement its policies. The top officials of China’s thirty-three provinces are appointed by the CCP central leaders in Beijing. Yet the central leaders are continually frustrated by their inability to get regional officials to follow their orders.In a rapidly growing market economy, the old top-down bureaucratic methods of monitoring local officials are no longer working. Local officials bene? t more by colluding with local businesses to promote economic growth by spending on big development projects than by providing such social goods as environmental protection, health care, education, and quality food and medicine that are mandated but not fully funded by the central government. Corr uption at the local level is rampant.Yet the poor provision of social goods by corrupt local officials could heighten public resentment against the government and threaten CCP rule on the national level. Theoretically, there are several ways that Beijing could resolve the dilemma of how to oversee the performance of local officials. It could allow citizens to elect their own local leaders. It also could permit independent NGOs to monitor the performance of local leaders. A fully autonomous court system in which prosecutors put corrupt officials on trial and citizens sue for the bene? s being denied them also would help. But CCP leaders have been too afraid of losing control to undertake such fundamental institutional reforms. They have chosen instead to rely on the mass media to serve as a ? re alarm to alert Changing Media, Changing China 19 the center to problems at lower levels. 42 From their perspective, using the media looks like a less dangerous approach because they still lic ense media outlets and appoint most of their top editors, thereby retaining some power to rein in errant outlets. Media revelations of local malfeasance also bene? t the center by de? cting blame for problems away from themselves and onto local officials. The publicity appears to be working; surveys indicate that Chinese people are more critical of the performance of local officials than of central ones, in contrast to the pattern in American politics. The center’s interest in using the media to monitor local officials has been evident since the mid-1990s. CCTV, with the encouragement of the powerful propaganda czar Ding Guangen (see chapter 2), created a daily program called Focus (Jiaodian Fantan) to investigate issues at lower levels in 1994.Miao Di, in chapter 4, discusses Focus in some detail. The program was blessed with high-level political support, having been visited by three Chinese premiers and praised by China’s cabinet, the State Council. The show attracte d a wide viewership and strengthened the credibility of television news overall. However, because local officials intervened so frequently to block exposes of their misdeeds, the show now has become much less hard-hitting.The central authorities tolerate greater press openness on the type of problems that, if left unreported and unsolved, might stir up serious popular dissatisfaction—in particular, problems with water and air pollution as well as food and medicine quality. Some national-level environmental officials have become adept at using media events such as, televised hearings on the environmental impact of important projects to mobilize public pressure on lower-level officials to comply with centrally adopted policies that are environmentally conscious.Veteran journalist Zhan Jiang describes the pattern in chapter 5, on environmental reporting: â€Å"as a general rule the center has an interest in receiving information that reduces the information gap between the cent er and localities regarding potentially volatile problems resulting from negligence by local officials. † However, as he illustrates with the case of the Songhua River chemical spill once journalists pull the ? re alarm and alert Beijing and the public to a crisis, then the center tries to reassert control over the media to cool off ublic emotions and convey an image of a competent government that is solving the problem. Recently, the central official media have been given the green light to pull the alarm on abuses by local officials. For years, reports have been circulating in the foreign human rights community and the international press about provincial and municipal governments that detain local citizens who have 20 Changing Media, Changing China come to Beijing to petition central officials about their grievances with local officials.They lock up the petitioners in illegal detention centers (â€Å"black jails†) on the outskirts of Beijing, ostensibly for â€Å"le gal education,† and then ship them back home. In November 2009, the official magazine Outlook (Liaowang) broke the story of these illegal jails and the report appeared on the Xinhua Web site. 43 Not surprisingly, local officials are wary of media watchdogs and do what they can to fence them out. As Tsinghua University journalism professor Li Xiguang has noted, â€Å"The central government, in the ? ght against the widespread corruption of the local government, encourages journalists to write exposes of the corruption.But the local governments are very much protective of themselves and of their power, so there is a con? ict between the central government and the local government in dealing with journalists. †44 Censorship by provincial and local branches of the CCP Propaganda Department and the State Council Information Office is viewed by journalists as tighter than that at the national level. The essays in this book offer numerous examples of local governments’ blackouts of critical news stories and the strategies journalists and activists use to evade them.Ever since the 1990s, regional commercial newspapers have been doing investigative reporting of corruption and other abuses on the part of local officials, but only outside their own home provinces. This practice is called cross-regional reporting (yidi jiandu). Since all local newspapers are part of media groups belonging to the local government and CCP establishment, editors naturally are inhibited from biting the hand that feeds them. Exciting stories about the sins of other people’s officials may be second best but are better than nothing.Reporters are willing to brave police harassment or violent attacks by paid thugs to get the goods on bad governance by officials in other places. Often they don’t have to go to the scene to report the story. As Ben Liebman describes in chapter 7, journalists blocked by local bans from writing about local malfeasance can simply e-mail the information to colleagues from other regions who then write the expose. Complaints from provincial and municipal officials about nosy reporters pushed the CCP Propaganda Department to ban the practice of crossregional reporting in 2004.Because the order was largely ignored, a year later provincial leaders raised the issue again, this time at the level of the Politburo. 45 Provincial leaders are a powerful group within the CCP, constituting the largest bloc in the Central Committee and one-quarter of the Politburo. Changing Media, Changing China 21 The interests of these leaders incline them to favor tighter restrictions on investigative journalism. As a result of their complaints, cross-regional reporting has been restricted to stories about officials at the county level or below.Only national-level media dare to publish exposes of provincial and municipal officials, and even then they usually wait until they get wind of an official investigation before reporting on the case. M eanwhile, local officials are learning the art of spin; they hold press conferences and online chats with Netizens to present an appearance of openness and candor—for example, Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai invited television cameras to broadcast live his negotiations with striking taxi drivers in 2009.The expansion of Internet access and the growth of the Web also make it increasingly difficult for local officials to enforce media blackouts on sensitive issues. Several chapters in this book discuss the 2007 case of the Xiamen PX chemical plant, a project ultimately defeated by the mobilization of environmentally conscious public opinion that breached a local media blockade. As Xiao Qiang tells the story (chapter 9), the outcome resulted from the â€Å"gap in control between local authorities as well as between local and central authorities [that] can provide a space for Netizens to transmit information. . . One of the most vocal advocates for the issue was the blogger L ian Yue, whose Weblog was not hosted within Fujian Province. Because officials outside Fujian, including the central government, did not share the local government’s interest in censoring news about the PX plant, Lian Yue was able to continue his Weblog and even get coverage in newspapers published outside Fujian. † MEDIA CREDIBILITY AND GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY Competition from the commercial media and the Web-based media has created what Qian Gang and David Bandurski call a credibility gap problem for the official media.In chapter 2, they compare the ways stories are covered in various kinds of newspapers, vividly illustrating that commercial newspapers’ reporting is far more informative and reliable than that found in official newspapers. Readers are abandoning the official media, and their preference is heightened during crises that arouse their interest and motivate them to search for reliable information. 22 Changing Media, Changing China Daniela Stockmann, in chapter 8, provides new data about how people in China choose between different types of news sources.They use the official press to get information on the government’s current policy position, but turn to the commercial media and the Internet for credible â€Å"real news. † As she explains, it is â€Å"the perceived disassociation from the government that lends credibility to the nonofficial media. † Stockmann happened to be doing a survey on media usage in Beijing in spring 2005 when student protests against Japan erupted. This serendipity gave her the rare opportunity to compare the way people use the media during normal times and during a crisis.What she discovered was that during a crisis, people have a particularly keen nose for where to ? nd credible information. Even when the propaganda authorities ban reporting of protests and try to homogenize coverage in all types of media, people are more likely to abandon official sources and turn to the commerci al press and the Internet than during normal times. The severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic in China in 2003 is referred to by several authors as a turning point in the relations between the government, the media, and the public.By ordering the media to play down early reports of people falling ill with a mysterious disease, a cover-up that allowed the virus to spread and kill more people, Beijing deepened public skepticism about the reliability of the official media and of the government itself. More important, the cover-up taught the public to look to new sources for the true facts. The searing SARS experience also spurred the determination of journalists to meet people’s need for accurate information during a crisis. The ? ght from official sources creates a serious problem for Chinese leaders, who need to prevent panic and antigovernment reactions during crises. Leaders plausibly worry that a widespread environmental or food safety catastrophe that angers la rge numbers of people about the same issue at the same time could snowball into a revolt against the CCP. Competition from the commercial media and the Web and the narrowing of the information gap between officials and the public forces the government to be more transparent to maintain its credibility.The State Council Information Office and Tsinghua University have trained hundreds of official spokespeople for central, provincial, and municipal government agencies to give press brie? ngs. The central government launched an E-government initiative, and almost every government agency (including very sensitive ones like the Ministry of State Security) now posts information on its Web site. Changing Media, Changing China 23 The trend toward government transparency got a major boost from the Regulations on Open Government Information that went into effect in 2008.The regulations require officials to release information during disasters and emergencies and permit citizens to request the release of government information. An activist took advantage of the opening to request budgets from government agencies. When in October 2009 Guangzhou released departmental budgets and Shanghai refused to do so on the grounds that this information constituted state secrets, the media and online public went wild criticizing Shanghai’s excuse. 6 Xinhua piled on by reprinting many of the critiques, in